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1
INTRODUCTION
GORDON HAWKINS
Associate-Professor of Criminology,
Sydney University Law School
The Special Sentencing Seminar on. the Parole of Prisoners Act
(N.S.W.) 1966 was the' third seminar organized by the Institute of
Criminology to deal with the subject of sentencing. Reports of the first two
seminars can be found in the Proceedings of the Institute of Cﬁminology
(1967) and the Proceedings of the Institute of Criminoloy No. 1 (1969).
The earlier seminars dealt with a wide variety of questions which arise
in relation to sentencing. They included discussion of such matters as the
general principles of sentencing and the problems of variation, disparity and
anomaly in sentencing. By contrast the third seminar was more restricted in
scope. This was because of what the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, the Honourable Sir Leslie Herron in his opening address,
called the “wise decision” to confine discussion. to one topic and to deal
only with the question of parole.
This topic had not been ignored in the previous seminars. At the
1967 Sentencing Seminar the Honourable Mr Justice Allen, who was then,
and still remains, Chairman of the N.S.W. Parole Board, delivered a paper
on “The Role of the Parole Board”. Again at the 1969 Judicial Seminar on
Sentencing he delivered a paper on “Sentencing in relation to~the Granting
of Parole”. At the 1971 Seminar he presented a further paper which was
prepared jointly by himself, His Honour Judge Levine who is Deputy
Chairman of the Parole Board and Mr J. A. Morony formerly
Comptroller-General of Prisons for N.S.W. and a member of the Parol
Board. ~
That joint paper which was entitled “Parole of Prisoners Act 1966 (as
amended)”'is printed here. It formed the principal textual basis for the
seminar and was circulated to participants beforehand. As will be seen it
deals with certain crucial aspects of the Act which the authors selected for
treatment as being both of some general signiﬁcance and, as they say,
“presently of common concern”. The principal matters treated in it concern
the role of the sentencing judge in relation to parole and the powers of the
Parole Board.
The form which the seminar, which was held on March 22nd 1971,
took was as follows. After an introductory address by Sir Leslie Herron, Mr
Justice Allen spoke to the paper. He dealt first with some of the problems
which had been experienced in relation to the speciﬁcation of a non-parole
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period by the sentencing judge. He went on to describe the signiﬁcant
changes made by the amending Act of 1970. Mr Justice Allen was followed
by Mr Morony who dealt specifically with the powers of the Parole Board.
At the end of his address Mr Morony dealt with an extended series of
questions relating to the powers of the board and its operations. Those
questions together with his answers to them are included here in the text
which follows. The next speaker was Judge Levine, who dealt with the
duties of the sentencing judge in relation to parole and the problems that
arise for him in ﬁxinga non-parole period.
The next stage in the seminar consisted of a discussion of two
exemplary cases, details of which had been circulated to participants and
are included here. The cases were introduced by Judge Levine and, after
each of his introductions, questions and discussions followed, the transcript
of which is also reproduced. Discussion of the cases was followed by a brief
general discussion after which the seminar concluded.
The choice of parole as the subject for discussion at this seminar was
determined by the fact that members of the Institute had expressed a desire
for more detailed consideration of this topic than had been possible at
previous sentencing seminars. But it may also be thought to be an apt and
appropriate choice because of the fact that parole is the one distinctively
Australian contribution to penological theory and practice.
It is true that the development of parole has until recent years been
largely American. But it is significant that when, in 1865, the Massachusetts
Prison Board made the first American plea for a parole system, an
Australian precedent was cited in support of the recommendation.
Specifically, the Board referred to the “ticket-of—leave system” instituted by
Governor Phillip in New South Wales, three-quarters of a century earlier.
There are however significant differences in the way in which the use
of parole has developed in the two countries. It is of course used far more
extensively in America than in Australia. This may merely reflect the facts
that, despite our earlier initative, the parole system as we now know it was
developed in America nearly a century before its adoption here. Moreover,
with the passage of time it is to be expected that this difference will
diminish. The Report of the N.S.W. Parole Board for 1970 reveals that
since 1967 only 26 per cent of prisoners paroled have been returned to
gaol for breach of parole; and moreover that nearly two-thirds of parole
revocations were for breaches of parole conditions rather than the
commission of further crime. In the light of these figures it is to be
expected that the Minister for Justice the Hon. J. C.’ Maddison, who is a
member of the Institute’s Advisory Committee, may feel that the case
which he has in the past made for widening parole opportunities is now
suffiéiently strong to justify the implementation of that policy.
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A more fundamental difference however emerged in the course of the
seminar. It was referred to explicity by Professor Elison of the University
of Montana who is also Chairman of the Governor’s Crime Commission in
Montana. He said amongst other things that, in Montana, “We are not
bound quite as much in this morass of the non-parole period There is
no non-parole period given. The prisoner is eligible for parole after serving
20—25% of the sentence given by the judge. ,He is automatically eligible to
apply. Not that he will necessarily receive, but he is automatically eligible
to apply for, parole at that point of time”.
It was because of the provisions in the Act relating to the ﬁxing of a
non-parole period and also of course because the seminar was a Sentencing
Seminar that the predominant emphasis was on the role of the judge in
relation to parole. Judge Levine drew attention to the “important difference
between the judge’s function in determining what the non-parole period is
in the ﬁrst place and the function of the Parole Board later on to
determine whether he be allowed parole, even though the judge has made
him eligible”. And he stated that it was “the primary purpose of the Act
to ensure that the sentencing judge, as part of the sentencing process, and
at the time of sentencing, includes a non-parole period.” In the
circumstances therefore it is not surprising that what he called “the enormity
of some of the problems” which arise “at the moment when sentence has
to be imposed” loomed large in the seminar discussions.
What help did the seminar provide for those faced with these
problems? In his concluding remarks the Chief Justice referred to this
question and gave an answer to it.
“I have learned from this seminar” he said “Probably no more than
the fact... that this discretion must be exercised on judicial
principles but mainly on intuitive reasoning of experience in the judge.
He also said that‘he believed that “there is a great deal to be said
about the unexplored depths of discretion in the judiciary”. It should be
added that Judge Levine in speaking on the duties of the sentencing judge
made some specific recommendations regarding the necessity for providing
the judge with the necessary “material upon which he can make a
determination about a non-parole period”.
A more radical suggestion however emerged in the course of discussion
arising out of the second case presented to the seminar. For Mr Justice
Hardie raised the question whether it would not be possible for legislation
to provide a formula in terms of a percentage to the effect that after a
prisoner had served 50% or 60% of his sentence he would have the right to
apply to the Parole Board. Judge Levine responded to this suggestion by
saying that he thought it was “a very wise one”. He added “I see no
reason why there shouldn’t be legislation to say that every sentence carries
a non-parole period of one half unless the judge otherwise orders”. This of
course amounted to acceptance in principle of the type of system operating
in Montana as described by Professor Elison.
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The possrbility of adopting a system of this kind had earlier been
referred to brieﬂy by Mr Justice Allen in his opening paper. It would, he
said, “be more in accord with the Scandinavian and the United Kingdom
practice, . .. It would overcome a number of problems. It would relieve the
sentencer (judge or magistrate) from. concerning himself with predicting the
unpredictable. But that is not what our statute provides. It is a matter not
for us but for the legislature if this is thought to be a desirable change”.
Whether or not legislative action to implement some such proposal is
likely or 'not is beyond the scope of this introduction. What did emerge
from the seminar however was that there is a case for considering a change
in legislation. Possible the. adoption of the British system (whereby the
prisoner is eligible for parole under the statute if he has served one year or
one-third of his sentence whichever is the larger) might be regarded as
meeting the difficulty.
If the British system were adopted there is another feature of it
which would go some way toward meeting what is really the crucial
problem in relation to parole; that is whether a prisoner who is eligible for
parole in terms of time served should be paroled or not. For in the United
Kingdom the National Parole Board is provided by the Home Ofﬁce
Research Unit with an estimate in terms of a percentage of the reconviction
probability, within two years of release, of every prisoner who is eligible for
parole. This of course is not the only factor taken into consideration by
the Parole Board in recommending parole. But if something like this could
be provided for the New South Wales Parole Board it would at least
diminish the difficulty involved in what Mr Justice Allen referred to as
“predicting the unpredictable”. . '
Chairman ’s Opening Address
, ‘ 5
CHAIRMAN’S OPENING ADDRESS
THE HONOURABLE SIR LESLIE HERRON, K.B.E., C.M.G.,
Chief Justice of New South Wales
I would like, ﬁrst of all, to thank members for their presence here
this afternoon, and to welcome tWo very outstanding visitors from overseas.
The ﬁrst is Professor Russell Niles, who I think is known to a lot of you.
He is about to take up his post as Director of the Institute of Judicial
Administration in New York University. I have myself many times visited
that Institute, where they organise seminars of this sort for the purposes of
the judiciary, both at the ordinary level and also for Judges of Appeal right
throughout the State, and indeed, I think, right throughout America. The
other gentleman of ' note is Professor Larry Elison, who comes from the
University of Montana and is also the Chairman of the Governor’s Crime ’
Commission in that State. Both are extremely welcome at this seminar
organised by the Institute of Criminology.
I make no apology for what little pressure I might bring to bear on
people to attend these seminars, because I am convinced that they are a
valid exercise in both the judicial sphere and the administrative sphere. I
have made several visits to the United Kingdom between 1964 and 1970
and have followed the progress of these sentencing seminars ever since the
first one organised by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, in 1963. I was
in Canada last year as the guest of the Canadian Bar Association, and I was
able to- see what was being done there too. In both countries they have .
managed to persuade the judges, the lawyers, the administrators, academics,
and indeed everybody, of the benefits that can be gained from these
seminars. Indeed, since 1963 a gradual practice has been established to
promote greater judicial understanding of the problems of sentencing,
particularly in England, where Lord Parker has prepared schemes to carry
the matter further by having longer conferences than the one-day ones that
we are used to. They started off by having them for one day but now they
run into two or three days, with working parties limited to about one
hundred holders of judicial office of various grades, including the Judges of
the High Court of Justice, Recorders and Chairmen of Quarter Sessions.
'In this State we haven’t quite achieved this degree of judicial
concurrence in these proceedings, but I think that those who at first were
difficult to convince — the judges of the Supreme Court — will ultimately
live to take a commanding position in these seminars, and that eventually
one’s hopes will be justified and we will achieve a greater degree of
uniformity in sentencing policy and a deeper understanding of the. social
factors involved in sentencing. I might tell you that it is my considered
opinion that in England, after many trials, seminars of the style we are
conducting here this afternoon have the unanimous approval — and I stress
the unanimous approval — of the Lord Chancellor and the whole of the
judges of the Queen’s Bench Division. In Canada it is thought that a
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common faith in the true- administration of justice is the firmest pillar of
good government, and the University of Toronto, which conducted national
sentencing seminars a few years ago, was complimented on its assuming
leadership in what was then an international proceeding on the frontiers of
criminology and inter-related disciplines.
May I just read a little remark that was passed by a ~very eminent
American judge {Judge William Hurland of the United States Federal
District Court. He said ——
It is a primitive superstition still extant in certain quarters that the
life of a sick person can be saved by changing his name. Whatever
may be the anthropological basis for this livesaving technique we must
resist the temptation of borrowing the analogy and assuming that
problems are. solved through the expedient of a new vocabulary. Thus
there is 'no ultimate signiﬁcance in the use per se of such terms as
correctional techniques and rehabilitative potential in lieu of the
administration of probation and parole, or there isn’t any ultimate
signiﬁcance in using the term the etiology of antisocial behaviour in
lieu of the term the causes of crime.
It is the Judge’s view that this underlies the whole of the question of
correctional techniques and rehabilitation matters —-.that those concerned
with sound reform should not mistake nomenclature for wisdom and build
a Babel of labels.
It was, I believe, a wise decision reached by the Institute to conduct
this seminar 'on a restricted basis and to deal this afternoon only with the
question of parole. Besides being a'se'ntencing procedure, this also of course
has the merit of being a new social reform, and so would have a greater
'appeal to a number of people here who wouldn’t be concerned with the
procedures of sentencing. And I think you will agree when Mr Justice Allen
has delivered his paper and you have heard the comments of Mr Morony
and Judge Levine that not only is parole now an essential part of the
sentencing discipline but that it must also be regarded as a very important
social step forward in the protection of the community from crime by its
treatment of prisoners in this SOphisticated fashion.
With these few opening remarks, I will now ask the Honourable Mr
Justice Allen to present his paper.
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PAROLE OF PRISONERS ACT, 1966, AS AMENDED
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE P. H. ALLEN;
Chairman of -the Parole Board of New South Wales
It is not intended that this paper be an authoritative or definitive
guide to parole. Much less is it intended by this paper to discuss, refer to
or resolve all the circumstances and principles on which the court and the
Parole Board will act in relation to the statutory duty imposed by the
Legislature under the Act.
What has been done' is to refer to aspects which occur to the authors
to be presently of common concern. Generally the circumstances and
principles which guide and determine a decision to make eligible for parole
an offender upon whom a gaol sentence has been imposed are not the same
as those which guide a decision to allow an offender to be at liberty upon
the terms of a Common Law Bond. In the latter case liberty is usually
permitted to a young and unhardened offender to afford him an
opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institutional confinement.
Sentence is deferred and the judge there and then determines the conditions
upon which the offender shall be at liberty. If there be a breach of those
conditions it is the judge who determines whether the conditions be
changed or a gaol sentence be imposed (not for the breach but for the
original offence), and of course the offender’s conduct in the meantime is a
very material matter and an important factor to be taken into account.
The decision to grant parole or not is only made after the sentencing
judge has decided that the offender is not a proper subject for probation
and that institutional confinement is desirable on the ground that it is
necessary to deter the offender himself or as a general deterrent in respect
of his proved associates and necessary for the protection of the public or it
may be an integral part of any programme for the offender’s long-term
rehabilitation or for other reasons.
Parole is a system which permits the release of the prisoner before he
would ordinarily beVdue for release upon conditions which will include his
recall to gaol if he fails to comply with the terms of his parole.
In the case of parole the offender is sentenced and commences to
serve the term imposed. What the judge does is to fix a period‘ of time
before the expiration of which the prisoner does not become eligible for
parole, and it is for the Parole Board to determine whether the prisoner be
paroled or not and upon what conditions he be allowed at liberty. It does
so upon the circumstances relevant at the time of its decision.
The sources of information available to,the Board are much different,
wider and to a large extent more reliable than those available to the
sentencing judge when he fixed the non-parole period.
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The judge’s decision whether or not to make the prisoner eligible for
parole forms part of the sentence and is a very important judicial function.
The judge’s decision is made upon the evidence before him at the
time he passes sentence and once sentence is passed he is functus ofﬁcio
and any non-parble period he fixed (subject to any order of the Court of
Criminal Appeal) cannot be shortened (except by the Board in the specified
circumstances referred to in 8.6 (2) (a) (i) of the Act — see below).
1. Duties or sentencing judge:
(a) Where the person to be sentenced is not already serving a term of
imprisonment and the court then imposes a term of imprisonment of more
than twelve months the judge shall (and in the case of a lesser term may)
specify a “non-parole period” (which shall not in any case be less than six
months) before the expiration of which such person shall not and after the
expiration of which such person may be released on parole, and any period
so speciﬁed shall be deemed to commence at the time the sentence is
imposed (s.4 (2) (2a) ).
It has been suggested and no doubt the simplest formula for
performing the duty imposed on the court under s.4 is, after passing
sentence in the usual form to add: “of which period I specify a period of
-1 ----- - (not less than six months) to be the non-parole period”.
(b) In the most general terms the criteria for granting parole are:-
(i) Reasonable probability that the prisoner will live and
remain at liberty without violation of the law, and
(ii) such release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society.
In determiningwhether a non-parole period should be speciﬁed the
judge must consider whether on the whole of the evidence before him the
prisoner is likely tobeneﬁt from parole. Where the prisoner-is a professed
professional criminal, or has a long record for similar offences, or the
offence was committed whilst on bail or parole, it is unlikely that a short
non-parole period would be specified unless a strong case for it has been
made out, and in some the court may refrain from specifying a non~parole
period at all.
However, in some cases where the prisoner is young it is usual to give
him the opportunity to be released on parole with the consequent
advantages of the help and guidance which the Parole Service can afford.
Where the prisoner on sentence says he does not want parole, a non-parole
period may yet be specified because often during the passing of the
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minimum of six months gaol which must be served, and the counselling
available from parole officers, the prisoner undergoes a change of mind and
in due course when he becomes eligible he seeks parole.
The general policy and intendment of the Act is that a non-parole
period should be speciﬁed wherever possible so as to make the prisoner
eligible for parole sooner or later, so as to place him under the control of
the Parole Board (Reg, v. Osborne (1968) 3 N.S.W.R. 291;. Reg. v. Griffin
(1969) 90 W.N. 548; Reg.‘ v. Davison (1969) 91 W.N. 1; Reg. v. Barben
(1969) 92 W.N. 182).
(c) Where the person to be sentenced is already serving a term of
imprisonment (referred to in the Act as the original term) and the person is
sentenced to an “additional term” of imprisonment cumulative upon the
original term or as partly cumulative and partly concurrent with the original
term, in such case the court shall where the total period during which the
person sentenced is to be imprisoned, as 'a result of the imposition of the
original term and the additional term, exceeds twelve months and may in
any other case specify a period (non-parole period) before the expiration of
which the person so sentenced shall not be released on parole (s.4A (2) ).
(d) Where in respect of the original term a non-parole period had not
been previously fixed, the non-parole period to be specified at the time an
additional term is imposed shall not have the effect of rendering the person
sentenced eligible to be released on parole earlier than the day on which he
would have become eligible to be released in respect of the original term
had he not been sentenced to the additional term (s.4A (d) ).
(e) Where in respect of the original term a non-parole period had been
specified, the non-parole period specified in the sentence imposing the
additional term shall ,be in substitution for the non-parole period specified
when the original term was imposed (s.4A (4) (b) ) but shall not have
effect to the extent that it would be shorter in duration than pr purport to
expire earlier than any non-parole period for which it is in substitution
(s.4A (4) (c) ).
(0 Unlike the situation which arises under s.4 of the Act where the
specified non-parole period is deemed to commence as at the date sentence-
is imposed, any non-parole period specified under and in the circumstances
specified in s.4A of the Act will be deemed to commence from the day on
which the original sentence was imposed.
Accordingly for the sentencing judge properly to carry out his judicial
function under s.4A of the Act, (he should have evidence to inform him:
(i) Date of imposition of any original sentences being served.
(ii) The date the prisoner could ordinarily expect to be released
after ordinary remissions in respect of the original sentence.
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(iii) Whether, in respect of the original sentence, a non-parole period
has been specified and the date upon which the prisoner would
have become eligible for parole thereunder.
(iv) If the prisoner is in gaol serving the balance of a sentence
following a revocation of parole,'the judge should be informed
how long he had been at liberty under parole and what balance
of sentences remained to be served and when he would
ordinarily be released in respect thereof.
Because the prisoner is back in gaol serving the balance of an original
sentence under revocation of parole would not of itself alone preclude a
substituted non-parole period being ﬁxed for any additional sentence, but
before doing so the judge would expect to have the following additional
information:
(i) Whether revocation following the commission of an offence
whilst on parole, and the nature of the offence.
(ii) If revocation was for breach of a condition of parole, particulars
of the condition and its breach.
(iii) Information on the prisoner’s behaviour whilst on parole.
Such information could probably best be supplied by a report in
writing from the parole officer.
In all cases where more than one sentence is being considered it is the
aggregate period as one entity which must be looked at when fixing a
non-parole period.
Where the judge proposes to specify a non-parole period 'under s.4A,
it is suggested he does so in the following terms. “In respect of the
aggregate terms of imprisonment imposed on you I specify a period of
............ to be the non-parole period” It may be more convenient
and mbre easily understood by the prisoner to merely specify a date upon
which he is to become eligible for parole and merely specify a non-parole
period which shall expire on ............ , car'e' being taken not to offend
againSt the prohibition as to time set out in s.4A (4) (c) and (d).
2. (a) The judge is not bound to fix a non-parole period in every case.
Where a decision iS'being considered in the circumstances to which s.4 or
s.4A apply (and in the latter case whether or not a non-parole period has
been specified in the original sentence), if it appears to the court that by
reason of the nature of the offence or the antecedent character of the
person convicted, the specification of a non-parole period is undesirable, the
court may refrain from doing so, but in such cases the court must give its
reason in writing (s.4 (3); s.4A (5) ).
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(b) The essence of parole is liberty under the help and guidance of a
parole officer and where such help and guidance could not'be given effect
to parole has been refused —— a leading case is Regina v. Hull (1969) 90
W.N., 488. In that case it was an American serviceman in Sydney on R.
and R. leave. He was indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter
and sentenced to ten years hard labour. The judge specified a non-parole
period of three years, stating that “in view of the peculiar circumstances
that he is a member of the Armed Forces of the USA. and was in this
country on R. and R. leave, I do not want to impose any prolonged bar on
any administration decision that may be taken by the appropriate
authorities, and for this reason alone I fix a non-parole period of three
years”. On appeal by the Attorney-General the Court of Criminal Appeal
held that the sentence was proper and adequate, but it was not a case for
the specification of a non-parole period because — “if he should be released
from prison, it is not to be thought for a moment that he would remain in
N.S.W. to be rehabilitated for the remainder of the sentence of ten years,
or that he would be subject to the parole officer’s directions, or that he
would be liable to serve the balance of the term in case of revocation”, and
held that it was a proper case to refrain from specifying a non-parole
period within the meaning of 5.4 (3).
A somewhat similar case was that of Regina v. Macaulay & ors (1969)
90 W.N. (Pt. I) 682, in which a non-parole order was not fixed because the
prisoners were to be returned to New Zealand upon their release from
prison. The Court of Criminal Appeal stated: “The object of the Act is to
rehabilitate in this community offenders who are released on license and to
order their return to prison in the event of a breach of such parole”.
However, in the case of Regina v. Howard(l968)2NSWR 422 the Court of
Criminal Appeal on the Special facts in that~ case stated: “In all the
circumstances, therefore, we vary the sentence by reducing it from four
years penal servitude to three years penal servitude. We fix a non-parole
period .of twelve months in each case. We would respectfully suggest to the
Parole. Board that when it comes to consider the case of these young men,
some arrangements be made, if possible, with the New ‘Zealand parole
authorities to enable the appellants to be returned to their own country
and supervised there”.
The Parole Board is of course well aware of the difficulties which
may arise when the question of deportation arises as a factor to be taken
into consideration. One unusual case dealt with by the Board was where
one I. H. was convicted at Sydney Quarter Sessions of robbery and
sentenced to four years and a non-parole period of twelve months was
specified. J. H. was a Scot, who came to Australia one year before
conviction, 31 years of age, without prior convictions. By the time his case
came up for consideration by the Board it was known that he had an
excellent prison record and very good parole reports and ordinarily parole
would have been granted, but it was also learned that he was married with
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two children and that during his imprisonment his wife had become
pregnant to another man and at her request had been expatriated, and that
J. H. on release was to be deported by decision of the Commonwealth
Government. In this case parole was refused on the ground that his
deportation would prevent the operation of any sanction of parole
provisions and he could not be afforded the professional supervising and
counselling which is the essence of parole.
(c) In cases where the prisoner falls within the provisions of s.12 of
the Migration Act, 1958 (Commonwealth) and is liable to be deported,
other considerations may apply. Where the question is one of uncomplicated
deportation it is to be remembered that the decision to deport is in the
hands of a Minister of the Commonwealth Government who in practise does
not decide whether or not to deport until a part (usually a substantial part)
of the sentence has been served, and he may and often does permit the
offender to remain in Australia.
In such a case a judge may well consider that early release of the
prisoner on parole might depend on whether the Minister would permit the
prisoner to remain in Australia. In such a case the judge might well decide
to fix a non-parole period and state the problem for the beneﬁt of the
Board.
The Board is, of course, well aware of this position and has dealt
with such cases on a number of occasions. The Board, when it comes to
consider the granting of parole has facilities in its administrative capacity to
ascertain whether the prisoner is to be deported, and has many times
expressed its view' that parole involves release on conditions, with the
sanction of return to prison on breach of conditions, and with a
professional staff supervising and counselling the parolee, and if these
conditions are not applicable the parole system cannot function.
Deportation is something over which neither the sentencing court nor
the Board has any control, and it is a matter upon which advice can come
forward at any time during the sentence and in which a decision once
taken may be reversed. It would therefore seem preferable that a non-parole
period be speciﬁed in such cases and that it be left to the Board to decide
such cases at the more appropriate time, namely, just before the offender
becomes eligible for release on parole.
(d) The Board has made exception from the‘general rule in respect of
New Zealand, where there is an arrangement, voluntarily operated, under
which a prisoner paroled to live in New Zealand could be held to the
conditions of release, by professional supervision and counselling and any
breach could be reported to the Board. Undoubtedly the Board, although it
could revoke the parole order, could not arrange for its execution but in
.this regard New Zealand is no different from Australian States, and it could
well be wrong to refuse parole to, say, a Victorian returning to his home in
Melbourne.
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(e) A like question to deportation is extradition-and where there are
in existence warrants for the arrest of the prisoner which have been issued
in other States of the Commonwealth and it appears likely that on release
the prisoner would be arrested to return to face other charges elsewhere, it
might seem that ﬁxing of a non-parole period would be not warranted. But
as in deportation, extradition is something over which neither court nor
Board has any control. Often a decision to extradite is reversed and, where
the court is about to impose a substantial sentence, the fact that interstate
warrants for the arrest of the prisoner are in existence may be disregarded
in considering the speciﬁcation of a non-parole period. In such case the
court may assume that when the prisoner becomes eligible for parole the
Board would then investigate the position, and ordinarily parole would not
be granted if his release would be followed by arrest and extradition to
another state.
(f) In some cases the prisoner states to the court that he does not
wish to have a non-parole period specified. This he states because he either
believes he has not a hope of the Parole Board ever granting it or that he
prefers to serve his sentence so that upon release he will not be under
restriction.
It may be that such an attitude might indicate that he intends to
persist in a criminal career on release, or that in any event he would not
give the parole officer the, necessary co—operation needed to effect his
rehabilitation. In neither case should such attitude preclude the fixing of a
nomparole period because it is the court and not the prisoner who must
decide whether he should be made eligible for parole and, indeed, a
prisoner who has so spoken may well change his mind under the inﬂuence
of parole officers he would see in prison and in the end seek release on
parole.
However, were his attitude to persist, although the Board has power
to grant parole against his wish, it would be most unlikely to do so because
such an attitude would amount to a refusal to co-operate and indicate little
hope for rehabilitation.
3. The Powers of the Parole Board
(a) It may be useful to first indicate some matters which are not
within the power of the Parole Board:
(i) The Board has no power to remit any sentence.
(ii) The Board has no power in respect of sentences in default of
ﬁnes; sentences of periodic detention; life sentences; sentences of
Habitual Criminals, nor in respect of persons in custody during
the Governor’s Pleasure. However in the latter three cases the
Board has a responsibility of reporting to the Minister on the
case of any prisoner referred to it by the Minister and has
certain special requirements placed upon it in respect of
Governor’s Pleasure cases, but no executive power.
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(iii) The Board has no power in respect of any prisoner in whose
sentence no non-parole period has been speciﬁed on the grounds
either of the prisoner’s antecedent record or ,the nature of his
offence.
6. The Board has, by statute, powers:
(a) to specify a non-parole period if the omission by the court is
not in accordance with sections 4 and 4A — section 4C;
(b) to bring forward the date of expiry of a non-parole period for
excellence in prison —— Section 6 (2) (a) (i);
(c) to grant or to refuse or defer consideration of the granting of
parole where there is a proper non-parole period specified ~—
sections 6 (2) and 6 (3);
(d) to specify conditions of parole and to vary them — section 6
(2);
(e) to revoke parole orders, a power which is mandatory if a
sentence of three months or more is imposed — sections 6 (2B)
(2C) and (2D).
5. Section 4C provides the only initiative power possessed by the Board;
it is otherwise dependent upon the court’s decision in the first place to
specify a non-parole period.
Unless the court refrains from specifying a non-parole period for the
reasons given in and on the terms provided by section 4 (3) the court has a
judicial duty imposed by the Act to specify a non-parole period and so give
the Parole Board power to act. This duty includes the judicial function and
responsibility of determining the minimum period of sentence to be served,
which the court must pronounce publicly' and in the presence of the
prisoner, and it is improper for the court to avoid its duty by saying that
it does not decide what it considers a too difficult question and so leaves
the fixing of a non-parole period to the Board under s.4C of the Act. That
section is not there to transfer from court to Board any part of the
sentencing process but merely to enable the Board to do what the court
has by inadvertence 'or lack of information omitted to do.
Where a court specifies a non-parole period, the Act places upon the
Board the requirement of considering the question of parole prior to the
expiration of the non-parole period; this is generally interpreted, for fairly
obvious reasons, as being shortly prior to the expiry of the non-parole
period. Upon its consideration, the Board may grant parole or may refuse
parole or may defer the question for a particular period or from time to
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time as circumstances require. When granting parole, it may impose
whatever conditions seem to be proper (although it seldom sees a
- requirement to pay compensation as proper). (See general and special
conditions appended.) .
The Board, and the Board alone, has power to bring earlier the date
of expiry of the non-parole period by the use of section 6 (2) (a) (i). It
depends entirely upon reports emanating from the penal establishments and,
except in unusual circumstances, follows the recommendations of that
administration, and is limited to a maximum reduction of four days for
each month ~of actual servitude. '
The Board has power to revoke parole orders; it is mandatory if a
parolee is imprisoned for three months or more; in other cases it is
discretionary.
A circumstance sometimes overlooked is that the Board cannot
function without a judge presiding and that no decision, determination or
recommendation shall be made by the Board unless three members, one of
whom is the Chairman, concur in them. The decisions, even its
recommendations, must have a majority of the Board and must have the
, concurrence of the Chairman (or, in his absence, the Deputy Chairman).
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COMMENTARY ON THE PAPER
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE P. H. ALLEN,
Chaimmn 0f the Parole Board of New.South Wales
I had not proposed in presenting this paper to do more than refer
brieﬂy to the several points which we have endeavoured to make', and then
leave the matter open- for discussion.
The Parole of Prisoners Act has been in force for a little over four
years. In that time something like 2,300 prisoners have been released on
parole, and of this number about 600 have had their parole revoked. I
don’t propose to worry you with statistics, as they are unrewarding unless
looked at in the proper context and in great detail and are boring
otherwise, but if you were to take those figures, over 70 per cent complete
their period of conditional liberty, and of the 20-odd per cent recalled the
majority were for a breach of parole conditions and not as a result of a
further conviction. In otherwords, if we should take 100 cases at random
from our files, a group of 100 parolees of all types and ages, 70 will be
found to have survived the period, often— with minor breakdowns and
warnings, 20 are recalled for some serious breach of conditions, and 10 on
reconviction for a further offence.
The Act is primarily concerned with one aspect of the sentencing of
convicted offenders, and the Chief Justice has adverted already to the
restricted nature of our discussion at this seminar. The aspect with which
the statute is concerned is of course the specifying of a minimum period to
be served, and our paper is an attempt to emphasize, and perhaps raise for
discussion, some of the problems which from our experience — still limited
— seem to arise. I would like to mention just two or three of these
matters, and I am speaking, as I am aware, to an audience most of whom
are thoroughly familiar, and all of whom are not unfamiliar, with the
nature of the problem.
The basic difference between probation and parole need not be
elaborated on to those who are here today: probation dealing generally ,with
those who have not been to prison, and parole with those who have. But it
is still perhaps worth restating that sentencing is essentially a judicial act,
performed publicly, and the specifying of a non-parole period is an'integral
part of the sentence imposed. It is for the Board to accept the Court’s
sentence and the period duly specified, and then at the appropriate time to
deal with each case as a parole prospect.
The paper emphasises the limitations to the powers of the Board not
by way of any complaint, but to indicate that the Board operates within
the limits of defined powers and discretions. The Board’s power originates
in the sentencing court’s specifying of a minimum period at the conclusion
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of which the case is to be reviewed. This seems a statement of the obvious.
I make it only because on occasions a sentencer (and this includes of
course the judges and the magistrates: probably 80 per cent of the cases
which come before the Board are done by Chairman at Quarter Sessions,
the few, by comparison, by judges of the Supreme Court, and a limited
number, growing less because of the amendment to the statute, by
magistrates) will say in effect, “I do not feel able at this stage to ﬁx a
non~parole period, but will leave it to the unfettered discretion of the
Parole Board”. That is not appropriate, because the case will not come to
us. Our power hasn’t been given life. It has birth in the specifying by the
court of the non-parole period. If, to diverge for one monent, the' statute
said, “Every prisoner shall have the right to have his case considered when
he has served one-half of his sentence or at such earlier period as the court
may impose”, that would be more in accord with the Scandinavian and the
United Kingdom practice, and this may appeal to some schools of thought
as a desirable policy reform. It would overcome a number of problems. It
would relieve the sentencing judge or magistrate from concerning himself
with predicting the unpredictable, and give him the reserve of power to ﬁx
a short period if he desired. But that is not what our statute provides. It is
a matter not for us, but for the legislature, if this is thought to be a
desirable change.
The Board, within its jurisdiction, leans towards granting parole, if this
seems to be a reasonable proposition, either at the time speciﬁed or shortly
thereafter. But of course there are a number of cases where the grant of
parole seems quite unsuitable, or where some deferment is seen to be
necessary. In the published reported figures for the years 1969 and 1970 it
is seen that in the ﬁrst year the number of paroles granted was slightly less
than half of those considered, so that the number refused was slightly
greater. The balance tilted the other way in 1970. To illustrate this: in
1969 there were approximately 600 granted and 630 refused; in 1970 there
were 700 granted and again 630-odd refused. On those ﬁgures you will see
that the numbers dealt with in a ﬁnal way were not significantly greater in
1970 compared with the year before. And the trend for the last three
months, up to last Friday, is not very dissimilar. There are more at this
period being granted than refused, but over a long period the balance is
rather of the fifty-fifty type.
You might say that that doesn’t indicate a very liberal attitude, or a
very strong fulfilment of my suggestion that the Board leans, towards parole
where practicable. It may be that we are too restrictive. I think in
comparison with Victoria we are less inclined to regard every ﬁrst case as
entitled prima facie to parole. We are very much guided by the nature of
the reports of the Parole Officers who have examined the cases over a long
period, and particularly of their Principal Parole Ofﬁcers, who,in discussion
with other Parole Officers, come to a conclusion, not always the same
conclusion, so that we sometimes have a dichotomy. Occasionally we have a
discussion with them, but their recommendations are given the greatest
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weight, because they are in the best position to be right. We don’t hold
them responsible if we go wrong, but we have to rely on them for the
simple reason that we are not, from a practical point of view, as a
part-time Board of ﬁve, able to interview more than a‘ small proportion of
the applicants for release. We see odd ones of those who have. determinate
sentences, particularly if the Parole Ofﬁcer asks us to do it, and if we think
it will help his hand or help the prisoner to understand our problem as well
as his. But when one remembers that the Board is every week dealing with
60 or 70 different ﬁles, different cases, of which perhaps less than half will
be new cases, it will be understood that even with a Board sitting ﬁve days
a week it wouldn’t be possible to interview with any degree of detail every
applicant for parole.
We do (I might comment on passing) interview all those. who are life
sentence prisonerS‘or who are detained during the Governor’s Pleasure, in
respect of whom we are obliged to make a report to the Minister on the
aspect of their continued detention or the question of their release. We
have no executive authority in such cases. That is one of the limitations
referred to in the paper. But we are obliged by the statute to make a
report on those cases -— life sentence prisoners, habitual criminals, and the
Governor’s Pleasure cases, the last being of course nearly always the most
difﬁcult cases, ‘the most unpredictable and the most worrying cases, because
they are cases of mental illness.
The paper refers to two different stiuations which face the sentencing
judge: ﬁrstly, where the convicted offender is not already serving a term of
imprisonment, and secondly, where he is. Where he is serving a term of
imprisonment it may be, and not infrequently is, a term imposed upon him
by the revocation of his parole. The man is out on parole, his parole may
be revoked for one of a number of reasons. He may have pleaded guilty at
a Magistrates’ Court and been committed for sentence for a crime similar to
that for which he had originally been sentenced. And he may also, or
separately from that, have been completely out of touch with his Parole
Ofﬁcers or disobeyed their instructions, and his whereabouts may even be
unknown to them. If his parole is revoked a warrant is issued, and ’if the
warrant is executed, at the time he comes before the court which is to-
sentence him for a new or different offence the judge is then dealing with
the convicted offender who is already serving a term of imprisonment. 8.4
of the Act, as amended by the 1970 Act, deals with that situation, and it
is fair to say that it causes a lot of trouble. The section has come before
us in various forms, following perhaps difﬁculties or doubts that the
sentencing court has had in relation to particular cases, and we have quite
often had some discussion and debate about its application. It probably was
not designed to deal entirely with the question of a revoked parolee, and I
imagine that some of my friends sitting as Chairmen of Quarter Sessions
who are busily sentencing people week after week have come to the same
conclusion and made to themselves some impatient remarks about the
legislation, and perhaps the Parole Board, although we didn’t pass the Act.
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We don’t deny full responsibility for its style, but looking closely at it now
I am not entirely satisfied that it is clear in all respects in relation to the
sentencing of a man who is serving a term as a result of a revoked parole.
But that is not a very common instance. The more common one is where
he has two sentences: an existing determinate one, and there is to be
another one imposed. But I will come to that in a moment, and deal now
with the ﬁrst of the two situations.
This situation is where the man is not serving a term of
imprisonment. He may have had earlier terms, but he is not then serving a
term of imprisonment. The only observation I would wish to make on that
is that the specifying of a minimum period which expires at or close to the
date of release by remission is bound to cause trouble and difﬁculty. In
most cases the prisoner is not willing to accept conditional liberty at that
point: he is to be released next month anyhow. He is not willing to
co-operate with the parole supervisor. He feels that he is gaining no
significant time and that he has not had his case fairly assessed. This is
from his point of view. The Parole Service may not have been left with
sufﬁcient time for counselling or supervision or after-care. I think almost all
of you who have had the duty of sentencing convicted offenders will have
realised by now that it is seldom that any period much beyond the
half-way mark can be really suitable, having regard to the statutory
remissions, which include not only the one-third or one-fourth applicable to
all determinate sentences, but the additional special remissions available to
“remedial” types who undertake some training programme, are sent to an
open camp type of institution, or qualify for industrial remissions. Once a
man is classiﬁed as “remedial” by the Classification Committee he may —
not immediately, but during his term — be given a training programme
regarded as suitable for his particular style and case, and while he carries
this out satisfactorily he will earn two days a month. He may be sent to an
open camp where he is given a good deal of freedom and trust, and he will
be entitled to two days a month whilst he is there. This is more often the
younger type of man.
There is an industrial remission which can be allowed to a prisoner
who is _ not in the camp classiﬁcation group. His presence is required,
perhaps for one of a number of reasons, at one of the maximum security
prisons, but he is a good enough type otherwise and he may be given
industrial remission. No one gets six days a month (the three two’s), but a
man may get four days a month for a period. If I have been inaccurate in
this statement, my colleague, Mr Morony, will be ready to correct it,
because he would be more knowledgeable about the details of that than
any other person here.
So that although remission, or a portion of it, may be lost (and a
portion of it frequently is) my'inquiries indicate that 90-odd per cent of
prisoners retain their basic remission, less, at the worst, a few days. Of
course there are a number who may lose a great deal of it, perhaps all of
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it. A man who escapes can lose all remissions up to the time of his escape,
and so on. A man who is sentenced to cells for a disciplinary breach in the
prison loses four days for every day of the cells. So he can lose quite a bit.
But by and large it is safer to assume that the person to be sentenced
will be due for release before the expiration of the sentence — the
regulation says that he is entitled, and I don’t know that that is always
understood. “A convicted prisoner who is serving a sentence of one month
or more, and who is not an Habitual Criminal, shall be entitled to a
remission of one-quarter of the sentence period provided,...” and it goes
on to say that if he hasn’t been imprisoned previously for three months or
more he is entitled to one-third. That is the statutory regulation. There are
qualifications as to the Commissioner’s right to apply it, and to those other
matters to which I have already referred.
» I
So that whilst a sentencer, it is always said, should impose a sentence
without regard to what remissions may be earned subject to good
behaviour, when it comes to specifying the minimum or non-parole period
to be saved it is necessary to bear in mind what the date by remission will
be. It neednit be precisely ascertained to a day, or a week, or even a
month, because it will ﬂuctuate with the events that happen while the man
is undergoing his sentence. But I can see no great difﬁculty in the sentencer
saying: I will fix a period at the half-way mark (or earlier, down to six
months — it is not permissible to make it earlier than six months) from the
time the sentence is imposed.
l
The second situation arises where the court is faced with sentencing a
person who is already serving a term of imprisonment; then the sentence
imposed either exceeds the period left of the existing term or it does not.
The Act talks about it being an additional term imposed cumulatively, or
partly cumulatively and partly concurrently. For instance, suppose a man
who has 12 months yet to serve of an existing sentence comes before the
Court of Quarter Sessions for a further offence of break, enter and steal,
and the Chairman decides to impose a sentence of 18 months or 2 years.
He then decides on that aggregate to fix a non-parole period, and the Act
requires him to do so if the effect of the new sentence exceeds the old as
an aggregate — and the emphasis is on the aggregate. And on the aggregate
he imposes a non-parole period which is deemed to commence at the date
of the imposition of the original sentence. Now, that seems a little bit
cumbersome, and if it is going to cause any difficulty in specifying, I would
think (speaking for myself, and I thinkthe members of the Board would
not disagree, but we are not sentencing personnel in this sense) that it
would be simple, appropriate, and in the interests of clarity, for the judge
to say: I fix on the aggregate a non-parole period to expire, say, 6, 9, 12
months from this date — taking care not to offend the section which says
that he can’t be released earlier than he otherwise would be. The Act says,
“deemed to commence at the date of the imposition of the original
sentence”, true, but it doesn’t say that he must enumerate it in months or
days or years. It says “specify a period”, and he specifies a period if he
marks its delimitations. Sometimes, but not very often, I have seen that
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done in cases that have come before us, and if it is done carefully everyone
knows the date and there are no arguments, no doubts.
If we have cases where it is not clear to us on the record what the
judge said, or what he meant, we are always inclined to seek a copy of the
transcript or get the exact words of the judge’s remarks on sentence, and
then carry out the intention, if it be possible. If it is seen that there has
been a mistake — not necessarily the fault of the sentencer, because he may
have been relying on information, incorrect information, given to him from
the ﬂoor of the court by someone in authority, acting bona ﬁde .— and if
the period specified is not in accordance with the Act, to save the problem
of referring the matter to the Executive Council for the Royal Prerogative
of Mercy, and back to the judge, and so on (which probably couldn’t be
done) the statute entitles the Board to fix a non-parole period, at the
expiration'of which it will look at the case in the light of such reports as
are available.
Well, now, the tedious part of the section requires (1 say “tedious”, it
is a little bit involved) that on the aggregate that is fixed, first of all, the
non-parole period shall not be less than six months, and then if no earlier
non-parole period had been fixed it mustn’t make the prisoner eligible for
release earlier than he otherwise would have been. There are other
provisions, but I don’t think I need elaborate at the moment. But it would
be necessary for the sentencing court to be informed, if there is such a
situation, of the date of the original sentence and its non-parole period if
there was one specified, and the date when the man may be fitted to be
released in the ordinary-way by the operation of the remission system.
The amending Act of 1970 made three changes of significance which
would affect the sentencing court. First, it requires the specification of a
minimum period only when the sentence exceeds 12 months. If the
sentence is less the court may if it wishes, specify such a period, but while
previously the requirement applied to sentences of 12 months now it applies
only to those exceeding 12 months. This has the effect, as'you will at once
realise, of removing it in many cases from the responsibility of the
magistrates, who, I imagine, welcomed the amendment with undisguised
delight. It wasn’t done for any reason except that when you have a
sentence of 9 or 12 months and you start with a 6 months non-parole
period there is just no time left for anything, and more often than not the
man would be out before his non-parole period expired, and so it became
very unattractive to implement these matters, and unnecessary. But it is
realised, of course, that there could be particular cases where in a sentence
of 12 months the magistrate may have in mind the need for some
supervision in the particular case and may specify a period of 6 months for
non-parole -— but he is not obliged to do so.
The second amendment was that the non-parole period must now
date, in the ordinary case, from the time of the imposition of the sentence
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itself, even though the sentence is backdated. As you all know, it is almost
invariable for' the judge to be told: the prisoner has been in custody since
(a certain date). Nearly always in the Central Criminal Court in the case of
a murderer no bail will have been allowed, and in many cases at Quarter
Sessions bail would not have been obtained, or may have been refused. At
all events, it is customary to date the sentence back to that period. It may
be in some cases months, several months — all too many months, you often
think. If in that case a non-parole period of 6 months was specified it
would either have expired or would very shortly expire, and the period of
obServation and classification and initial training, and the like, would not
have been sufﬁciently under way, and we nearly always felt obliged to
postpone the matter for a short period until the man had served as a
prisoner something like 6 months, or slightly more. The statute now
overcomes that problem, and provides that the non-parole period
commences at the moment of its imposition.
Then, as I mentioned earlier, the Board has power to ﬁx, itself, a
period, when none has been fixed, either by inadvertence or by mistake, or
one has been fixed that is not in accordance with the Act for some reason
which might or might not be apparent on the record.
These, I think, are the important, or practical, amendments the 1970
Act imposed. It came into force in April 1970. The paper doesn’t deal in
detail further with the amendments. We have added to it a reference to the
limitations of the Board’s powers, already referred to, as well as the powers
it does have, which I have already mentioned. And with the revocation
power it is important to remember that revocation is mandatory under the
new Act if the prisoner is sentenced to 3 months or more for a further
offence. It is not automatic. Under the Victorian statute it is automatic and
the machinery of it is a little bit awkward, there are aspects in it which
make an automatic revocation somewhat difficult when there is an existing
sentence. But we needn’t trouble about that, in our case it is mandatory.
This isn’t a perfect system either, because if a man is sentenced to 3
months the case might not come before the Board for a week or two in
the ordinary course of events. I think what we do is to make the
revocation effective from the time of its first report to us. But if the
sentence is not for 3 months or more revocation is discretionary. Of course
it isn’t often that a man is convicted and sentenced for less than 3 months.
There are such cases, but we do not see very many of them.
The other ground of revocation is an application by the Parole
Service, whose officers may report to us, “This man has been arrested, he
hasn’t answered the bail which he obtained, inquiries at his residence and
his place of work have been fruitless, we haven’t seen him for several weeks
and we don’t know where he is. He is reported to have gone to Victoria.
Please revoke the parole order”. This is examined by the Director or, under
his direction, some other senior officer in the Service, who examines the
ﬁle on the case, and if he supports the recommendation the parole order is
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revoked. Of course if the man’s whereabouts are not known the warrant
probably lies in police hands, like many others, for a long period, but it is
effective when he is rearrested to recall him to prison to serve the whole
balance of his term. The period of his parole does not count in his favour,
and he is not entitled to remissions on the balance of his term. This last,
circumstance is one that we are not very agreeable to see, but it is the ‘
interpretation placed by the Crown Solicitor on the wording of the existing
remission regulations, and subject to their being amended this is the
situation: he goes back to serve the balance of his term, he has lost his
earlier remissions, he gets no further remission except in special cases. But
of course the Board’s power to grant are-parole still exists.
The form of the Parole Order is appended merely as a matter of
interest. Some of it may appear to be rather overweighted with conditions,
some of them not in very simple words from the point of view of the
prisoner, but the parole ‘ofﬁcer endorses on the back of his copy what the
man must not do. If he is not to go up to the Kings Cross area the parole
ofﬁcer puts that in black letters on the back and tells it to him a number
of times. It wbuld be a very odd case where a prisoner could successfully
persuade you that he didn’t know what he was required to do and what he
was obliged to refrain from doing.
In particular cases one or two other special conditions may be added.
The most usual one is that he shall not drink. Every so often the offence is
seen to be linked, with the man either being an alcoholic or likely to
become one or having a very bad record of drinking. In many cases he
admits it and doesn’t object to the clause. He knows it is going to get him
out quicker, and will submit to anything. But we do not like imposing this
condition unless there is a solid reason for it, because you restrict the
operation of his supervision. Most men who are on parole will be working
somewhere, and they go home with their mates and want to drink at the
local hotels. But where there have been cases- of personal violence, or of
culpable driving whilst seriously affected by liquor, and people have been
ldlled or injured, it is often thought to be appropriate, particularly if a
parole ofﬁcer has recommended that such a clause be inserted. Sometimes it
is just “shall not drink”. If you put “shall not drink and shall not visit
places where drinks are sold”, before long someone will say, “I have got a
job singing in a nightclub, and it is licensed", or, “I am going to deliver
beer to the local hotel and if I go there ...” They tell you these stories,
not always on the iron line of truth, but we are simple people and we
often vary the clause within reason, particularly if the supervising parole
officer supports the parolee’s application.
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THE POWERS OF THE PAROLE BOARD
J. A. MORONY, F.R.I.P.A.,
Member of the Parole Board of NSW
I am concerned to open some discussion and comment on the section
of the paper relating to the powers of the Parole Board. I preface this by
saying that one should look first at the title of the Act which creates the
Parole Board. I think that some of the things that seem to be difﬁculties
are difficulties because this has not been ﬂilly realised, but the Act is a
Parole of Prisoners Act. It is not a Remission of Sentences Act; it is not a
Mitigation of Penalties Act. It is a release of prisoners on conditional-
liberty. An appreciation of this will, I think, clear some of the thinking
about the different references to sentence and to terms of imprisonment.
When you are talking about a prisoner, he is a prisoner for whatever is the
total of the sentences that he is serving, and if he is going to be released
he has got to be released in respect of the lot of them at the one time.
This is why one is constantly referring to the “aggregate” term, to the
“term of imprisonment”. I know there are times when the phrase “original
sentence” creeps in, but the essential feature here is that we are talking
about a prisoner serving a total term of imprisonment, and it is on that
total term of imprisonment that a non-parole period is specified.
On this question of aggregate sentence, there was a case which was
before the Board very recently in which a man was serving a sentence (I
think it was perhaps two years) and he had a non-parole period on that
term. During this sentence he escaped from one of the open establishments.
The judge who dealt with him for the escape was obviously sympathetically
inclined towards him, and awarded a sentence of 3 weeks. By the Prisons
Act any sentence imposed for escaping must be cumulative, so that in
effect this man then became a prisoner serving 2 years and 3 weeks. The
aggregate period had been increased, but the judge who was imposing the
sentence of 3 weeks apparently didn’t realise the significance of this, as he
said, “As I am only sentencing you to 3 weeks I am not specifying any
non-parole period”. The result was, of course, that the Board was presented
with a prisoner who didn’t have a nonfparole period. Fortunately it did
have power under 5.3 (c) to correct this situation. But this is an illustration
of very recent date of the need to look at the total aggregate of the
sentences.
I would like, if I may with respect to my Chairman, to comment on
some of the things that he said. One was his reference to the number of
paroles granted as against the number not granted. This has never been
dissected as to the reasons for ~not granting parole. I have looked at a
number of cases, but not nearly enough to do anything more than suggest a
couple of reasons, and these were adverted to by the Chairman.
One of these is that you don’t grant parole if the prisoner himself
doesn’t want it. There is nothing in the Act to stop you from doing it, but
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you don’t normally do it because you would be setting up for the Parole
Service a most unco-operative parolee. You are setting up a person who,
whether or not he is going to violate the parole order in terms of unlawful
conduct, is certainly going to resent his parole ofﬁcer and resent the fact
that he is on parole. There is, of course, in the Prisons Act a power under
which, in slightly different circumstances, he can be conditionally released.
There is no point at this time in going into the variations, but the mere
faCt that the man is refused parole doesn’t mean that he must be released
unconditionally when he has earned his remission.
Then if We look at those referred to by Mr Justice Allen where the
date of the expiration of the non-parole period is very close to the date on
which the man will be coming out anyway: if a man at that stage wants
parole as a prop upon which to lean, or for any other reason, he will get
parole; but in most cases where there is only a short period between the
date on which he could be released on parole and the date on which he
will be released by remission, parole is not granted.
You then have that comparative minority of prisoners who by their
misconduct in prison show pretty clearly that they are not good material
for parole — the serious assaulters and so on, even in the prison situation
(the people who have lost remission).
Therefore I think that before we start to interpret the ﬁgures of those
granted and not granted parole we should try to ﬁnd out reasons why
parole was not granted. Otherwise I think we may draw conclusions which
are not valid.
As you will have read in the paper, the powers of the Board ﬂow,
with one exception, directly from the specification by the court of the
non-parole period. The one power, one initiative, which the Board has
beyond what the court has given it is the one referred to earlier, and that
is the power to specify a non-parole period where the court, through
inadvertence or lack of information, has not specified a non-parole period
and has not given reasons in accordance with the Act for not so specifying.
You will realise that there are only two reasons for which the court may
properly decline to specify a non-parole period, and these are stated in
most general terms. One of them is the nature of the offence, and the
other is I think referred to as “the antecedent character of the person
convicted”. This may generally be interpreted as the antecedent bad
character of the person. Somebody did raise the question as to whether you
could decline to specify a non-parole period because of the antecedent good
character of the person, and made quite a clever, if specious, argument. But
that is the only initiative that is in the Board. Everything else'flows directly
from what the court does.
When the court specifies a non-parole period the Board may do one
of several things. It must consider the question of the grant of parole
before the expiry of the non-parole period, and this gives rise to one of the
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difficulties mentioned. One of the things that happend very early in the
Board’s existence was a case where the prisoner was convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment for, I think, one year, the sentence was dated
back by 6 months, and a non-parole period of 6 months was specified. This
simply pushed the Board outside the law, because the Board had to
consider the case before the non-parole period expired and the sentence was
not imposed until the day upon which the non-parole period expired. This
is one of the reasons why it is now required by statute that the non-parole
period should date from the time the sentence is in fact passed. So the
Board must consider parole, and when it considers it, it may grant it, refuse
it, or defer consideration to a later date, when it will of course either grant
or refuse it.
The Board may, in one set of circumstances, bring earlier the date
upon which parole may be considered. This is section 6 (2) (a) (i) of the
Act. This provides that where excellence is shown in one or more of a
variety of rehabilitative measures within the prison the Board ,may bring
forward the date of grant of parole, and therefore of course the date of
consideration of parole. This is done solely on the ground of excellence,
and only the Board can do it, although it is fairly obvious that the Board
can only do this on reports from the people who are supervising the
prisoner concerned. The Board does welcome the reports it gets and would,
I think, almost invariably act upon them.
The Board has power to specify conditions of parole. The Chairman
has already referred to the normal conditions and to those‘ special
conditions which may or may not be added.
The Board has the power to revoke parole. This is a power which is
discretionary in every situation except where the parolee is sentenced for a
fresh offence, that is, an offence committed during the period of the parole
order. Something that happened before he was convicted and has been kept
in reserve does not constitute a breach of the parole order. It must be
something that happened during the period of the parole order and for
which he' is imprisoned for 3 months or more, not merely sentenced to
imprisonment. In other words, if a sentence of 3 months is passed and is
suspended, his parole may be revoked but it is not mandatory upon the
Board to revoke it.
There is a further extension here when the offence is committed
dUIing the period of the parole order, and that is that the Board may go
back. A parole order may have expired by efﬂuxion of time and the man
may then be brought before the court, convicted, and sentenced to 3
months or more for an offence Committed during the parole period. In such
cases it is mandatory on the Board to revoke the order although it has
already expired, and the person is then committed to serve the balance of
his term of imprisonment in addition to the new sentence. The specification
of a non-parole period will then be on this aggregate term
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I have referred to the fact that it is the Board alone which has the
power to bring earlier the date of expiration of a non-parole period, and I
have dealt with the power of the Board to revoke parole orders. I think I
might conclude these remarks by giving you an answer to criticisms which
you may possibly have heard: that the Parole Board breaks down the
sentences of the courts. The Board does nothing of the kind; it can’t do
anything that the court has not already empowered it to do. And the
Parole Board, which has ﬁve members, can make no decision unless three
members, of whom one is the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman (both of
whom are judges of great wisdom and vast experience), concur. In other
words, although it hasn’t got exactly the same information, it is if anything
slightly stronger than the court originally imposing the sentence. The Parole
Board does not break down sentences of the courts, but I know that there
are some people in the community who think it does, and if, as may well
be, they say it to you, I think it is well to know the answer.
Q. .' I am curious as to the rationale for denying an absolute release
at the time of the determination granting remission even though
there was no parole. Is it correct that it might still not be an
absolute release? ,
Mr Morony.‘
Yes, that is the position, By law, a remission may be granted
conditionally or unconditionally. There is a power vested in the Minister
administering the Act to make it conditional if circumstances seem to
warrant that. It is usual for it to be unconditional when it is by remission
alone.
Q.: The powers granted by the Board concerning revocation are that
it may revoke a_ parole order, and it issues a parole order setting
up certain conditions. .Would you comment on whether the
Board has a discretion to revoke for circumstances which do not
bear directly on the conditions speciﬁed .in the parole order?
There may be circumstances where, a parolee is acting in ways
indicative of a breakdown in behaviour, possible of a criminal
kind, and the Board, perhaps as a precautionary measure, may
see fit to look at his case and determine whether or not
revocation rmy be indicated.
Mr Morony;
I think this is well within the Board’s power. If I may interpret it
this way: a man is serving a sentence or sentences for particular types of
offence, he is paroled on certain conditions, and although he has not
broken any of the conditions speciﬁed there are indications that he may
emotionally or psychologically break down and may do damage to the
community, — can the Board, as a precaution; exercise a power to revoke?
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Well, I think the Board has a discretion in this matter which is absolute,
but I think it would be very hesitant to revoke in such a case. I think Mr
Justice Allen spoke earlier of “predicting the unpredictable”, so I think the
Board would have to be absolutely convinced that it was acting in the only
possible way to prevent something happening that shouldn’t happen. I am
thinking of a case where it was thought that a man might be revoked
because of a relationship with another person who apprehended violence
from him. Now, there are provisions in the law for dealing with the
apprehension of violence otherwise than by revoking the parole order, and I
think this sort of matter should be handled in that way. But I would say,
to the core of your question, that I think the Board’s disrectiom is absolute
but that it would be very hesitant to revoke unless there were a breach of
a specific condition proved to its satisfaction
Q.: It is mentioned in the section of the paper on the powers of
the Parole Board that the Board has in effect some supervision
over people who are under Governor’s pleasure. Could you tell
us something about that particular situation?
Mr Morony:
The situation there is that that is a function of the Parole Board but
that it can never lead to the granting of parole. All that the Parole Board
can do in such a case is to report to the Minister. In other words, the
releasing is done in terms of the Mental Health Act, and it is done by His
Excellency the Governor on the advice of the Minister. The Board can do
no more, and it must do no less, when asked, than report its opinion to
the Minister.
Q.: ., Does a similm.v situation exist so far as life imprisonment is
concerned? .
Mr Morony:
Yes, it is exactly the same. I think there is a difference in
terminology in that so far as life .prisoners are concerned the Board is
required to report concerning the release of the prisoner while in respect of
Governor’s Pleasure cases it is to report as to whether continued detention
is still warranted. The move is from positive to negative.
Q.: Is there any reason why the Parole Board is given this very
onerous responsibility?
Judge Levine:
It is by Act of Parliament.
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Q.: Does the prisoner get two bites at the cherry? In other words, if
the parole is revoked, is he considered for parole again at some
later period if he is sentenced?
Mr Morony:
Can he be considered? Yes. Is he considered? This depends on
whether he seeks it or whether prison ofﬁcers or parole ofﬁcers suggest it.
It can be done, but it is not done automatically.
Q.: Has it been done?
Mr Morony:
Yes, quite a number of times.
Q.: Is it the practice that the prisoner should apply for parole?
Mr Morony:
If a non-parole period is specified then it has got to be considered
whether he applies or not. The Board likes him to apply, because as I
suggested earlier one of the factors it takes into account is whether or not
he wants to be paroled, so it does like to have from him something
touching his own feelings on the matter. On the question of re-parole, there
is now no non-parole period fixed and therefore there is no automatic
consideration by the Board. But on a non-parole period the Board has no
alternative — it must consider it whether or not he applies, because that is
what the statute says. ‘
Q.: When the non~parole period has expired, if a prisoner has not
. applied for parole, and parole has been refused, is it possible for
the Parole Board to reconsider it later?
. Mr Morony:
If a prisoner doesn’t want parole and the Parole Board, considering his
case (as is its obligation), refuses parole, and then two months later the
man changes his mind and says he would like to be paroled, he may then
apply, and the Board would be prepared to consider it again — not
necessarily to grant it.
Q.: Is there any machinery or procedure whereby the Board suggests
to each person who has been given a non-parole period that if
he wishes for parole he should make application for it? Or does
the Board just hope that they might make application?
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Mr Morony:
No, it is much more than that. This is organised by the prison in
which the man is serving his sentence. It is the prison which submits to the
Board the knowledge of when the non-.parole period expires. 'It submits
certain reports and it invites the prisoner to make his application. This is all
done before it ever gets to the Board.
Q.: I have three questions to ask: (1) Does (the Parole Board know
how many parole candidates refuse paroles, and for what reason?
(2) Is this reason frequently the proximity of the expiration of
the non-parole period and the date of release by remission? (3)
Should misconduct in prison necessarily, be a criterion for
rejection, or, in other words, is adjustment to prison life
necessarily related to adjustment to life in the community?
Mr Morony: '
Let us take them one at a time. The first one is, why do people who
refuse to go on parole, in fact refuse to do so. Well, I don’t think that is a
matter for the Parole Board to answer. I think that is a very much deeper
question.
Sir Leslie Herron:
I could give you one good reason. It is because they know that if,
they go on parole, then for the rest of the nominal sentence that they have
received from the judge they have to be on good behaviour. They are
vulnerable to recall to prison if they break the conditions of parole. But if
they get the ordinary remissions and then get out they are finishedwith
the sentence. ‘
Q.: My second question was: is one of the reasons for rejection of
parole by the prisoner the proximity of the date to that of
release by remissions?
Mr Morony:
Yes, it is quite often, and particularly for the reasons the Chief
Justice has just mentioned.
Q.: The third question: how do we know that conduct in prison is
highly correlated with-adjustment in the community?
Mr Morony.‘
I don’t think that the Board presumes that it is. I think the Board
takes what is perhaps a very commonsense view — that if a person is not
able to control his conduct in the regirnented situation of a prison it is
highly improbable that he will in the less regulated, or less regimented,
community. To that extent it is a factor. It is certainly not a determinant.
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Q.: The Board has power to specify conditions of parole, and I
wonder if you could say anything about the policy underlying the
determination of these conditions. In other countries you find
such conditions as that the parolee may not marry without the
permission of the parole authorities.
Mr Morony:
I think the prime policy is that the Board looks at each case as it
appears from the reports before it, and if it sees the necessity for a
particular condition, if that condition is'related to the offence for which
the man was convicted, and if the condition is a reasonable one in the eyes
of the ordinary person, then the Board might well fix it. But I can’t see
any circumstances in which the Board would make a condition that the
parolee shall not marry. I could see a situation in which the Board might
fix a condition that the parolee might not marry without the prior
knowledge of the supervising parole officer. I am not sure that I am
answering your question, but I am not sure that there is an answer. If you
were to ask, “Do you set curfews”, I think the answer would be that the
Board would be prepared to if it were convinced of the necessity and
convinced that a curfew could be policed. In many of these things it seems
to the Board that to set a condition which cannot be policed is worse than
not setting a condution at all, because this encourages the parolee to think
that he is getting away with it.
Q.: The point I am trying to bring out is that in my experience
there seems to be an emphasis by the Board on the promotion
of individual responsibility rather than an exercise of
authoritarian control.
Mr Morony:
I suspect that this is very much a compromise situation. In a Parole
of Prisoners Act there must be some authoritarian measures. In fact, the
sanction of revocation (and it is a fairly heavy sanction) is itself
authoritarian. But with the. authoritarian framework I think the
encouragement of individual initiative and the acceptance by the parolee of
responsibility are the most important things to achieve: But I don’t think
you can do this (and I don’t think you would suggest it) by throwing any
sense of authority out of the window. Parole has got to work within the
framework of the authoritarian, or the legal, system of the community.
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THE DUTIES OF THE JUDGE
HIS HONOUR JUDGE A. A. LEVINE,
A' District Court Judge and Chairman of Quarter Sessions;
Deputy Chairman of the Parole Board of N.S.W.
I accept the responsibility for that section of the paper which reads,
“Duties of the Sentencing Judge”. There are some matters that I think
ought to be referred to in addition to what has been said in the paper, or
should be emphasised perhaps a little more than they are in the paper
itself.
The first dominant matter is that the Act does put upon a sentencing
judge a duty to fix a non~parole period. That is the primary purpose of the
Act — to ensure that the sentencing judge, as part of the sentencing
process, and at the time of sentencing, includes a non-parole period. For
that purpose the judge ought to be properly equipped with argument and
evidence to assist him to make a decision. It is not sufficient at all for a
judge to decide, for instance, that the correct sentence be five years
imprisonment and then think a good safe non-parole period is always
one-half of the sentence and so specify a non-parole period of two and
one-half years. Indeed, if that is to be the system the legislation ought to
make it clear. It would be very simple for all the judges if the legislation
merely said that every time a man is sentenced, automatically half the
sentence is a non-parole period. There is an important difference between
the judge’s function in determining the non-parole period on sentence and
the function of the Parole Board later in determining whether he be
allowed parole even though the judge has made him eligible.
One of the big differences as far as the public is concerned is that the
judge acts in public. He fixes the non-parole period in the presence of the
prisoner. He hears evidence touching whether or not it is a proper case to
make the man eligible for parole, he hears that evidence in the presence of
the prisoner, and the prisoner, by his representatives, has the right to call
evidence and cross-examine witnesses. It is an important part of the judge’s
public function in sentencing to ensure that the listening and reading public
becomes aware of how it comes about that on some occasions prisoners
who have long sentences imposed upon them are made eligible for parole
after serving only a short period of their sentence.
In connection with the general sentencing of prisoners who are already
in gaol serving a sentence, problems do arise, because very often the law
requires that the prisoner must serve a particular sentence before he can be
paroled at all.
The simplest case, I think, is illustrated in the last case presented for
discussion, where the prisoner X., serving a long sentence, escapes at the
.end of one year. He goes to Victoria and serves a sentence there. In
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Victoria he is sentenced to three years but is allowed out after one year,
and he is then extradited back to New South Wales. The law is, of course,
that he must go back and complete the sentence he was serving at the time
he escaped, he must do the balance of the two years remaining when he
escaped. There then arises the matter of sentence in respect of offences
committed whilst he was at large: the man has come back, he has two
years to do to complete his old sentence, but whilst he was out for three
months he committed an armed robbery, for which I suppose even the
most lenient judge would think in terms of eight years. (In the case I have
in mind he threw down a policeman and, by putting a knife at his neck,
stole his pistol, which he used in the subsequent robbery.) Now, it may
well be that the sentencing judge wants to afford this man the right to be
paroled at some time, and it might be quite proper to come to that
conclusion, because in the meantime counsel may have produced evidence
that the prisoner has a marriage which has produced children, that a loving
wife will take him back, that he has set his heart against the criminal
career, and that he has been in gaol so long that he is thoroughly sick of
it. So it may well be that the judge will think that there is some hope in
this case, that the man is but thirty years of age and he should be given
the opportunity of having the advantage of a parole officer to guide him.
But the law doesn’t make it very easy, because he has his two years
balance to serve and on top of that he has a sentence for the escape, which
must be accumulative, and then of course there is this dreadful other eight
years that has to be tagged on somehwere. Can a judge, in good conscience,
make it run concurrently with all the others when it is a completely
different sentence altogether? In such a case the seriousness of the crimes
and the long sentences involved seem to militate against the judge ﬁxing a
short non~parole period. He must bear in mind, too, that under the Act he
can’t make the non-parole period shorter than the balance of the first
sentence still to be served — the prisoner has two years of the old sentence
tofinish. So if the judge should wish to say, “There is hope for this man
— I think he ought to be released”, then he is in trouble, because the
prisoner must serve at least those two years, and you can imagine what the
friends and relatives of the policeman who was assaulted and robbed would
say if they found that so far as the episode was concerned the prisoner had
to do only six months before he became paroled. I say this only to
illustrate the enormity of some of the problems which do arise at the
moment when sentence has to be imposed.
There is one other matter to which I would refer: when the prisoner
comes up to be sentenced, too few people in the administration of justice
are concerned, or feel obliged, to put before the judge the material upon
which he can make a determination about a non-parole period. Of course
the duty falls primarily upon his own counsel if he is represented, but
members of the Bar of New South Wales do not always direct their minds
sufficiently to questions of this type. Where a prisoner appears for sentence
and is not represented, I believe there is an obligation upon the Crown to
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put before the sentencing judge, without his asking for it, material upon
which he can exercise his duty on the question of a non-parole period. I
know that a judge has only to say, “I think we ought to have a probation
report”, and he will get it, but that causes delays and I think this should
be done automatically. .
The other thing I would refer to is that where a person comes for
sentence as a person who has been on parole at some time or other,'or a
person whose parole has been revoked and who is serving a sentenceon
that account, the sentencing judge should have a full disclosure of
information from the Parole Service. I am perfectly well aware that it
would not be a good idea to have all the parole officers coming into the
witness box and giving evidence against their charges, because this would
destroy an image, and in the end the criminal ‘world would perhaps think:
you had better be careful what you tell parole officers, because the next
thing you know they will be up there telling the judge and you will get a
longer sentence. l‘appreciate that, but a line must be drawn and a balance
must be struck. The judge must not be deprived of the information stored
away in the bosom of the Parole Service in respect of these people. It may
be that it can be done by the production of a parole report. Probation
reports fall into the same class, and they are not read in court. They are
ready by the judge and the prisoner but they are not read in open court,
and I have yet to hear of a newspaper seeking one out and publishing the
contents of it. Parole reports should be in the same category, and they
should be available. I don’t think that because a man has broken his parole
once it means that he is never to be permitted to have any further parole.
Indeed, it may be that he should be given another chance, but that will
depend on the parole officers’ reports, and I think they should be available.
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Q..‘ Could' you give us any ﬁgures for 1970 for the number of
prisoners released under section 6 (2) (a) (1')?
Judge Levine:
You are speaking about the excellence provisions. Well, the Board acts
upon information it receives from the prison authorities. That information is
gathered by the Commissioner of Corrective Services after consulti
ng
committees that he has set up and examining all relevant information, and
in the end he makes a specific recommendation. That does not mean that
the Board must act upon it. Perhaps Mr Justice Allen would like to speak
on this.
Mr Justice Allen:
The section 6 (2) (a) (i) situation in practice is this: the section says
that the Board may in effect grant a bonus of up to four days per month
of the period served. That maximum is very seldom approached. What
happens is that we recieve, well in advance of the expiration of the
non-parole period, reports that the prisoner has exhibited excellence (as
they call it) in some aspect of conduct, training, industry or. education, that
he has done this for a period of some months, and he is recommended for
an extra allowance of, say, three or four weeks. This report comes from a
special committee of inquiry into the prisoner’s conduct, industry, effort,
and so on, and in addition to this we have the prison comprehensive report,
which talks about his behaviour, work and attitudes. If the two match up,
and the recommendationseems reasonable, and there is no argument, the
Board then asks how much time is available. There may be only, say,
twenty days left before the expiration of the non-parole period, so we may
say, “Very well, advance the non-parole period twenty days”. Of course it
may not be\a parole case at all. The fact that the man has exhibited
excellence doesn’t necessarily mean that he is a good parole case —— it could
be contra — but usually they go together. Mr Justice McClemens has just
drawn my attention to the 1969/70 Report, which shows that 2 per cent
were released prior to the expiration of the non-parole period by virtue
of
section 6 (2) (a) (i), 70 per cent within three weeks of expiry, and 28 per
cent between one month and sixteen months of expiry. These percentages
were drawn from five hundred cases selected at random.
Sir Leslie Herron:
Before we take any further questions — although they are
perfectly
permissible, and in my opinion a good way to discover the
content of the
addresses — I am going to ask Judge Levine to outline the
first case and
indicate some of the outstanding features of that, and then
call upon you
to discuss these with him.
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Judge Levine:
Perhaps the best way is for me to read the case first and then
highlight the points. (Reads Case D)
Case D
.An example of a case involving the breach of parole by reason
of a further conviction, the imposition of accumulative sentences and
the question of specification of a non-parole period on the aggregate
sentence.
The case of D. has been selected to illustrate points which may
need to be considered.
D., then aged 20 years and the possessor of a juvenile criminal
record, was convicted in April 1968 on charges of breaking, entering
and stealing and larceny of a motor vehicle. He was awarded an
aggregate sentence, back-dated to 9th January 1968, and expiring by
effluxion of time on 8th July 1971. A non-parole period of 18
months was specified by the trial judge, and, .upon consideration of
uniformly favourable reports in the case, D. was granted parole in
July 1969, the parole order running until 8th July 1971. Had he not
been paroled he would have become due for release by remission
(assuming continued good conduct) on 13th March 1970.
On 19th September 1969 the Parole Board considered reports
that the parolee had not been in contact with his parole officer and
had failed to appear to answer charges preferred against him. As a
consequence, the Parole Board revoked the parole order and issued its
warrant for his commitment for the unserved and unremitted balance
of the sentence, namely, one year, 11 months, 22 days.
The Crown Solicitor has advised that remissions under the
Prisons Act and Regulations do not apply to the period resulting from
a revoked parole order. The warrant issued was executed on 29th
October 1969, and the period, therefore, would expire on 19th
October 1971.
* On 15th November 1971, Street J. in the Supreme Court in Equity declared
* contrary to the Crown Solicitor’s advice mentioned that remissions under Reg.
110 of the Prisons Regulations 1968 did apply to the period of imprisonment
resulting from a revoked parole order (Cheetham v. McGeechan — unreported).
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On 14th November 1969, D. appeared before Quarter Sessi
ons
on charges of having stolen three motor vehicles. Those we
re the
charges of which the Board had knowledge when it revoked parole.
He was sentenced to:
Two years hard labour on first charge;
Two years hard labour, accumulative, on second charge, and
One year hard labour, accumulative, on third charge —
a total of ﬁve years, the aggregate sentence not to commen
ce until
the completion of the previous sentence (i.e. the parole p
eriod on
19th October 1971.
The presiding judge declined to specify a non-parole period in
reliance upon section 4 (3) of the Parole of Prisoners Act 196
6, “in
view of previous antecedents”.
An application for leave to appeal against the severity of the
sentence was granted by the Court of Criminal Appeal, the a
ppeal was
allowed, the sentence was varied by reducing the sent
ence on the
second matter to two years hard labour concurrent, the ord
er for the
commencement of the aggregate sentence was unaltered
and no
non-parole period was speciﬁed.
Without canvassing the merits of the individual D. — he has a
bad record of offences, including eleven appearances before Children’s
Courts, but he was still young, was part-aboriginal, and had only o
ne
prior adult conviction 7— it is perhaps .proper to look at the pyramid
of penalties imposed upon him.
The original sentence of 3% years has to be served in full,
disregarding both the remissions earned before release and the f
ew
months he had at liberty. This is because he broke his parole order
by violating the law. For the same reason he was awarded five ye
ars
(reduced on appeal to three years) to commence after the completion
of the original sentence, which, incidentally, was the first sentence
he
served and followed his first conviction (his earlier appearances had
been before Children’s Courts).
But even that is not enough. The judge, for the same reason,
declined to specify a non-parole period. One might assume that D.’s
conduct after release affected him adversely in four ways:
1. Revocation of parole and a consequent‘loss of remission of
sentence;
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2. new sentence for new offences;
3. the new sentences being accumulative on the sentence in
respect of which he had been released; and
4. the decision not to Specify a non-parole period.
It is not for this note to presume to comment upon the
\ quantum of sentence. Its sole purpose is to bring to notice what had
happened and to indicate that if parole had been refused originally
there would have been no parole order to revoke, remission would
have been granted on the existing sentence, and the “new” sentences
could not have been accumulated upon the original sentence.
If the Board had decided, as it often does in slightly different
circumstances, to wait for proof of a violation of the law by his
conviction, new sentences would have been imposed before the
revocation brought the original sentence back into Operation and they
could therefore not have been accumulative. I
Ordinarily one would think that if a man commits an offence when
he is on parole the sentence should be cumulative, that he should not get
two for the price of one. The difficulty is that if he is dealt with by the
judge for the offence committed whilst on parole before he is revoked that
cannot happen, because the judge cannot cumulate the new sentence on the
balance of the' unserved period of the old sentence until it is revoked and
the Parole Board cannot send him back to serve the balance of his sentence
at the expiration of the new sentence, so they must be concurrent. This
might be a weakness in the Act.
Finally, although section 6 (3) empowers the Board to issue further
parole orders in respect of a sentence: being served in consequence of
revocation, in the case of. D. the action of the judge in declining to specify
a non-parole period on a cumulative sentence has blocked the Board out,
and it has no power to act.
1 don’t know that it is particularly related to this problem, but judges
of our Bench who sit in country towns have special problems arising under
the Act, particularly where a prisoner is arrested but can’t be brought
before the court until it sits there "next, which might be three months later.
The judge may sentence him to a term of say 12 months, but seek to date
it back for the period he has been in gaol waiting, and it may happen that
when he dates it back there is not enough of the sentence left for a parole
order to operate in. Under the Act, the parole period must be at least six
months and must commence from the date when the sentence is imposed,
so that if a twelve months sentence is dated back three months and the
non-parole period fixed at six months the non-parole period would expire at
about the time the prisoner would ordinarily be out on remissions.
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Q..' Assuming that this man had pleaded not guilty to the car
stealing charges and had been acquitted, what action would the
Parole Board have taken if it had revoked his parole and he was
back in gaol serving the rest of his sentence?
Judge Levine:
Under the present Act revocation is automatic if he is sentenced to
three months or more. But where a person is arrested and charged with an
offence, but not yet convicted, the Parole Board is given notice of those
happenings. It may. be that he pleads not guilty to the charge and is
acquitted, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that his parole will not be
revoked. The parole can be revoked for many reasons other than conviction
for a violation of the law. It may be that upon his arrest it comes to the
attention of the Board that this man had not reported for three months, or
‘that he had been telling a pack of lies to his parole officer, for example, he
was supposed to be living with his wife at a certain address and it
tranSpires that he was living somewhere else with another person; he had
said he was working, and he was not working. And it could be for those
breaches of the parole that he is revoked and goes back to gaol, so that
whether or not he is acquitted in the long run doesn’t affect the situation,
because the revocation was properly founded. However, if in the fulness of
time he is acquitted and what remains is that he is back in gaol for the
breaches of the conditions of his parole, then‘it may be that before his
sentence expires he will be paroled again.
Q.: This is assuming that he has done something else. But if he has
kept the other conditions of his parole and the only thing
against him was that he‘ was arrested and charged with these
three car stealing charges, and he pleads not guilty and is
acquitted, then it seems that the Parole Board might have been
a bit hasty in revoking.
Mr Justice Allen:
The Board would never revoke in these circumstances.
Judge Levine:
No, not ever. Frequently parolees commit other offences — all kinds
of offences —— for which they are charged, and sometimes they are
acquitted. Or they can be convicted of offences not worthy to ground a
revocation on. If a man is on parole in respect of a break-and-enter offence
and then he is charged with a trafﬁc offence, or using insulting words, his
parole wouldn’t be revoked on that account, because in my opinion his
behaviour in the public field is no better nor worse than the behaviour of
many other citizens. Although if he is serving a sentence for a crime that
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included the larceny of a motor vehicle and then he is found to be driving
without a licence, or driving an unlicensed vehicle, then that might be a
factor, because it indicates a return to his former behaviour.
Q.: If this man was entitled to one-quarter remission on the
sentence for which he was previously convicted, if he had served
his sentence and got out on 13th March 1970 (with no parole),
then done another five years, he would have been released (with
remissions) on 13th December 1973 — leaving out any period
for committing his further offences and being indicted. Now, as
it happened, he would have been out on 19th January 1974, so
in fact he has had to serve one month more by having had his
parole, had it revoked, had his appeal, and had the sentence cut
back to three years. This is my interpretation on the current set
of facts: in reducing the five years to three the Court of
Criminal Appeal must have had in mind what the effect would
be. '
Judge Levine:
Yes, I think that is correct.
Mr Justice McClemenst
There is one other thing that is very frequently overlooked. The
Parole of Prisoners Act speciﬁcally preserves the Crown’s Prerogative of
Mercy, and if in an individual case the existence of a set of circumstances
like this operated on an individual to perpetrate an injustice, there is
machinery by which this can be brought under the notice of the Minister
so that the exercise of the Crown’s Prerogative of Mercy can be invoked to
release the prisoner on licence under conditions. So that what may appear
on the face of it a serious injustice is something that can be remedied by
appropriate administrative action.
Judge Levine:
Yes, this is done. I know of cases where for various reasons the
granting, or the failure to grant, a non-parole period has in the
circumstances resulted in an injustice which the Minister has corrected by
the use of his prerogative. And, Mr Justice Street, may I say this: that the
peace and quiet of the Court of Criminal Appeal is a much better place to
make these intricate calculations than Quarter Sessions on a Friday morning
on plea day.
Q.: May I ask how often the mercy factor is adverted to in
practice?
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Mr Justice Allen:
There would be only an odd and exceptional case, where in the
situation of a determinate sentence, to put it broadly, something has gone
wrong and it seems to us that his man needs help. The judge would
support us, and we suggest that it be referred to the Minister. The Minister
then asks for a report, and I think it is fair to say that if the report is
relevant and sensible it is implemented, and the man receives what should
be fiat justitia. But this is a fairly rare thing; it isn’t often necessary. The
cases where the Minister is approached would perhaps be large sentence
ones and other cases of exceptional difﬁculty, where something had gone
wrong and this could be looked at and remedied. And I think it is proper
to say that the present Minister would be the ﬁrst to give us a sympathetic
hearing.
Judge Levine:
Might I just mention the other case where the sentencing judge
himself may suggest it? The judge, at the time of passing sentence and
ﬁxing the non-parole period, may suggest that if particular things transpire
and the prisoner makes an application to be released on licence he might
consider supporting it. For example, I can conceive of a false pretences case
in which the prisoner has extracted $10,000 from three families that badly
need the money, and the judge may say, “You have gotto go to gaol for
ﬁve years and I will fix a non-parole period of two and a half years.
HoWever, you -say you have got this money in a trust account in New
Zealand and you want to pay it back. If within six months this money is
repaid in full to these victims and yen ask to be released on licence, it may
be that I will support your application.” And, non-parole period or not, the
Minister could exercise his prerogative and release him. I don’t know that
this has ever been done yet, but I think that it could happen.
Q.: What is the position where a parolee who was sentenced for
some serious offence such as armed robbery or false pretences
then gets three months for driving at a speed dangerous to the
public? [s revocation still mandatory, even with an otherwise
blameless record? Is there no way out of it?
Judge Levine:
No, he must go back, because the Act says so.
Sir Leslie Herron:
I will now ask Judge Levine to read the last case, and then the
discussion can become general over all.
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Judge Levine:
This case is based on fact; but the details have been changed to make
it a little more interesting. (Reads Case X.)
Case X.
In May 1970, X. was called up for sentence upon pleas of guilty
to three charges: (1) escape from lawful custody (s. 447A); (2)
Larceny of a motor vehicle; and (3) armed robbery.
Antecedents and facts
He is aged 30 years, one of a family of six, the father deserted
the family very early in offender’s life, and neither mother,
companions nor general environment were conducive to good
behaviour.
He has been in trouble in Children’s Courts for offences of
dishonesty since the age of 13 years. In 1958 he was sentenced to
three years hard labour on five charges of housebreaking. He married
in 1965, and has one child of that marriage.
In March 1967, arising out of a drunken fight, he was convicted
of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was sentenced to
imprisonment with hard labour for three and a half years. After
serving one year of this sentence he escaped from lawful custody
(without doing injury to any person). Whilst at large he stole a motor
vehicle, and when stopped by a police officer for speeding he robbed
the ofﬁcer of, his pistol, under the menace of a knife but doing him
no physical injury.
He then drove to Victoria, where he committed a housebreaking
offence for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment and
ordered to serve a minimum of twelve months.
At the end of twelve months he was released in Victoria and
extradited to New South Wales to face the present charges.
.On sentence it was put on his behalf ‘that but for the short time
of his escape he had been in gaol continuously since his sentence in
March 1967. It was submitted that on his escape he went home to his
wife (which she confirmed) and upon her insistence that he surrender,
he decamped in anger and was stopped for speeding shortly
afterwards. '
His wife is respectable, and says that when not in gaol he has
been a good husband and provider, and his former employer in the
steel industry would have him back on release.
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The prisoner says he is now repentant and is sick of gaol life,
and that he would never again let his wife and child down, and asks
for a chance to prove it.
Finally, it is put for him that although he must go back to gaol
a short non-parole period should be speciﬁed.
Questions which arise are —
(a) What sentence should be imposed in respect of the three
charges before the court?
(b) What is the proper decision to be made under the Parole
of Prisoners Act?
Perhaps I could just make one or two cements, to invite criticism.
The three and a half years imposed in 1967 would ordinarily have expired
in August 1970, and with remissions he would have been released in
October 1969. But his escape in March 1968, and his capture 'in (say) May
1968 in Victoria, when he was given a three year sentence with a minimum
of one year, would result in his release in May 1969 in Victoria and his
return to New South Wales. On his return to New South Wales he still
owed the balance of the 1967 sentence, i.e., two and a half years, and
ordinarily that would expire in December 1971. Now, any sentence in
respect of the escape would be cumulative upon the sentence he_ was serving
at the time of the escape, so that if he were to be given six months for
the escape (a modest term in the circumstances) it would add six months
to December 1971. Then there remains to be assessed a sentence for the
robbery and for the stealing of a motor vehicle. I would think that any
sentence imposed in respect of the larceny of the vehicle would be
concurrent with any sentence for the armed robbery. The question is
whether the armed robbery (which I think might be worth about eight
years, a little more or less) should be cumulative on the sentence his
already serving.
Q.: In a case like this there are quite complicated mathematical
calculations to be made arising out of remissions by parole and
the normal remissions of sentence. Do you see it as the role of
the judge to make these calculations in the first instance?
Judge Levine:
It is true that when a judge ﬁxed a non-parole period he has to be
concerned with several things. One is to make sure that the non-parole
period is not longer than the time he would ordinarily serve with
remissions, and that is sometimes not as easy as might at ﬁrst appear,
because the exactitude of remissions can never be ascertained at the point
of time. When the Queen came out here recently, that added a lot of
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remissions that nobody had known about, and quite a few non-parole
speciﬁcations were put out of order on that account. Nor can you be sure
that remissions will be earned. So that the sentencing judge must allow
ample room for this situation.
The other thing I might say is that I think the temper of society at
this time is in favour of granting non-parole periods. Where a situation
arises such that the judge, despite all the evidence he can have before him,
can not make a proper judicial pronouncement in favour of a non-parole
period, but feels that there is some element outstanding that cannot be
determined at thattime (such as remissions), he should grant a non-parole
period, leaving it to the Board to make a decision at the proper time as to
whether the prisoner should be released on that date. In particular, that
applies to warrant cases. Very often the prisoner to be sentenced has
against him warrants for extradition to other States, and the judge may
think there is no 'sense in setting a non-parole period, because as soon as
the person is released he will be extradited to the other State to do the
sentence there. But this is not always so, because very often a warrant that
is in existence at that time may not be executed at all. The same applies to
warrants for extradition from other States and suggestions that the person
might be sent back to another country by the Commonwealth immigration
authorities. Very often he is not sent back at all. It is a Ministerial act, and
the judge can’t be sure that he will be sent back. I say this for myself
'alone, but I think the temper of the day is: when in doubt, grant a
non-parole period, relying on the Parole Board (which is well aware of all
these circumstances) to make a proper determination at the right time as to
whether parole should be granted.
Q.: Has the judge always got the necessary information available to
him, or could he do with some kind of specialised help from
the court?
Judge Levine:
He could do with help. One thing is certain: the judge takes the
responsibility for the order he makes and he also carries the responsibility
for ensuring that he has enough material to make the order. If he hasn’t
enough material he adjourns until he gets it. But very often the.Gaol
Recorder, whose job it is to give the information, doesn’t know. The
detailed information may be in the office of the Commissioner of
Corrective Services, but not in court. I have sometimes asked, “Didn’t he
get a non-parole period when he got that last sentence?” And he may say,
“Yes, he did. I forgot to tell you.”
Q.: The judge first has to make his calculations before he can
introduce other criteria governing the sentence and the date
upon which the non-parole period is to expire. Is this
information always available?
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Judge Levine:
No, some of the information is impossible to get. For example, the
judge cannot know how many remissions this man will be entitled to in
three years’ time. The best information he has is that the law will permit,
say, a one-quarter remission, so he has to assume he will get the best, and
make the order accordingly. But there is other information he can have
with certainty. If the man has been revoked the judge should be able to
know with certainty when he was revoked and when he went back togaol
and how much of that old sentence remains. Sometimes the Gaol Recorder
doesn’t know that, but in that case he has to ﬁnd out.
Q.: In the case cited earlier where a man had three weeks addition
to an existing sentence for escaping and the judge, in setting no
’ non-parole period, was apparently not aware of the effect of
this, surely this kind of information should be readily available
to the presiding judge?
Mr Justice Allen:
He knew the facts, but apparently he was mistaken about the legal
situation.
Q.: What kind of criteria are necessary for determining the
non-parole period?
Judge Levine:
All the criteria that have been classically set out that support parole
at' all — you don’t want me to give you all those. That is to determine
whether he should have parole at all. But as far as the period is concerned,
this is a very difficult situation, because one of the things on which the
judge has to make up his mind is what minimum period this prisoner must
serve to satisfy public indignation. You can’t have citizens going around and
cutting the man’s throat because they think the judge didn’t give h'un
enough. I speak for myself alone, but I think this is a factor. A second
thing is that very often a man doesn’t really qualify for parole until he has
served some sentence. On the evidence before the judge he may not have
shown any appreciation of the wrong done nor any fear of the penalty. So
the judge has the very difficult task of determining what sentence he should
serve for his own benefit so as to qualify for parole. Another matter is the
period necessary to act as a (deterrent. And of course there are other things
too. It has been said (although I am not dedicated to this myself) that if a
man has to go to gaol at all it may be that the period should be of
sufﬁcient length to give him some benefit within the gaol. For example, he
might be able to be taught to read and write, or become a carpenter.
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Arising out of what you said a few moments ago — that the
judge sometimes won’t have the material before him to know
what period he should fix — could not this'legislation do one of
two things: either provide for a formula, a percentage, and say
that after a man had served, say 50% or 60% of the time
sentenced he should have the right to apply to the Board: or
alternatively, if that is not practicable, or not thought wise,
would it not be wise to provide in the legisbtion that the judge
sentencing the accused could stand over to a later date —
fourteen days hence, a. month hence, three months hence — the
question of the non—parole period? [3 that permissible under the
legislation? If it is not, should it not be made permissible?
Judge Levine:
I think the answer to your ﬁrst suggestion is that it is a very wise
one. I don’t ordinarily like to get into the field of what the law ought to
be, but I see no reason why there shouldn’t be legislation to say that every
sentence carries a non-parole period of one-half unless the judge orders
otherwise. As for deferring it, of course the judge doesn’t have to pass
sentence immediately, and he can defer it. But I think the Court.0f
Criminal Appeal has laid down that it is not a good idea to adjourn a man
for any lengthy period to see how he gets on in the meantime. You see,
you have got to deal with him there.’
Q. .- I was rather suggesting that it might be prudent to enable the
judge to determine the sentence and defer the ﬁxing of the
non-parole portion, for which he may wish to wait and see how
the prisoner will react to prison life. Is that not practicable, or
permissible under existing legislation?
Judge Levine:
No, I don’t think it is permissible, because the ﬁxing of the
non-parole period is part of the sentence. The legislation says that the
non-parole period runs from the time that sentence is imposed.
Q. : Can you tell us what proportion of men with very bad records
finally get parole? Imagine the case of a man with a very bad
record who gets a long sentence and the judge (quite properly)
refuses to fix a non-parole period. He then appeals, and the
Court of Appeal decides to give him one last chance. Do you
know of many cases like that where the man has ﬁnally got
parole? You see, you are often left with the situation — “What
is the good of talking about parole, you never get parole”.
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Judge Levine:
My understanding of the situation is this: that once a non-parole
period has been set the prisoner becomes eligible for parole on the date
specified, and when he comes up for parole the Board stands with its back
against the offence and looks to the future. The man is eligible for parole,
and he will get it provided (so-and-so). Mind you, if he is in for an offence
involving violence or false pretences the judge must have in mind the
safeguards to the public on his release. Perhaps Mr Justice Allen could tell
you more about this.
Mr Justice Allen:
Well, we are always told by the parole officers that the occasion arises
where a man finally decides to turn from crime and hopes to do better.
This happens occasionally, even with a bad recidivist. Then, be it so.
Judge Levine:
I do know of one case where a young man said in court he didn’t
want parole. He said: why should he have it hanging over his head, and
“what is the good, you never get it anyway”. Well, he had about four or
five years, and I gave him a non-parole period of eighteen months, whether
he liked it or not. It so happened that when his case came up Mr Justice
Allen was away, and I took the Board, and I can remember there was a
letter in the file from his mother saying that the judge had said he could
have parole -— and he got it. He had changed his mind.
Q..' One point seems to me not to have been considered by judges
in sentencing. I think we are all agreed that there are remedial
aspects in parole, and in recognising this the State provides a
parole service of skilled people with a highly specialised kind of
training. But I feel that we in the Parole Service cannot really
achieve much unless we have the person under our supervision
for a reasonable time, and I would suggest that the practical
minimum in which we might exercise some influence on a
parolee is about twelve months; with a non-parole period of six
months we can’t have him under our control for more than six
months at the most, and it is likely to be only three or four.
So if a sentencing judge wants the accused to get the benefit of
whatever we have to offer, might I suggest that a sentence of
eighteen months or two years with a non-parole period of six
months would perhaps do more for him. In many cases the
short sentence, which might appear to be beneficial to a man, is
not in fact beneficial to him.
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Professor Shatwell:
There is one golden principle involved in this — the principle that the
total deprivation of liberty should be proportionate to the gravity of the
offence committed. The determination of the period for treatment should
be kept within the overall limit.
Mr Purnell (Senior Public Defender);
Speaking as one with some experience of people who are interested in
the parole period — I don’t know whether the Parole Board realises it or
not, but I think this legislation has done more for rehabilitation than
anything else I have seen in New South Wales.
Sir Leslie Herron :
We are very glad to have your opinion on this, Mr Purnell because I
suppose you would meet in person more criminals that I would in any
given year.
Q.: I would like to comment on the absence of a right of appeal
ﬁom decisions of the Board. Where a person has had his parole
revoked, or parole is barred, I believe there is recourse for a
second bite at the cherry. But as the legislation is framed it is
not apparent that there is 4a right of appeal from decisions of
the Board to a higher authority.
Mr Justice Allen:
No, there is not. Are you suggesting that there should be? The
amending Act gives us the right to rescind our original decision. We sought
this additional power (although we could probably have taken it ourselves
anyway), and we will, if an occasion arises we think proper, rescind a
decision and, although it has been a refusal, grant parole in special
circumstances. It would have to be a special case, but it can arise. So far as
the Board is concerned it will if necessary always go back and 100k at a
case again and again. Apart from the power to re-parole we will do .this,
especially if a parole ofﬁcer suggests that new factors have arisen. If he asks
us to re-examine the case, of course we would.
Reverting to an earlier question, I would think myself that the
suggestion for an arbitrary period for eligibility for parole is worth a lot of
consideration. And I also think» that Principal Ofﬁcer McKillen’s observation
that if you are going to have parole at all it should‘be for a substantial
period is valid and is to be recommended.
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Q..' Does the Board ever give reasons for its decisions — particularly
in an unusual case where it might have been pressed to give
some reasons?
Mr Justice Allen:
No, we don’t give decisions formally. We will often tell the parole
officer unofﬁcially, for his information, what has moved us to come to our
decision. But to give an ofﬁcial defcision like a little judgment might involve
two or three different reasons from different members. It might involve us
telling the prisoner that his. parole officer has recommended against him,
and this might be damaging to both of them. On balance we found it
undesirable to give reasons, and decided against it.
Q.: Is that uniform with Parole Boards in other parts of the world?
‘Mr Justice Allen:
I think it is in England. I can’t be sure about Scandinavia — I don’t
remember asking there. ,
Sir Leslie Herron:
I think everybody here is now oriented to the problem even if we
can’t profess to know all the answers. It is a very difficult problem,
depending so much, I feel, upon the discretion and the intuitive reasoning
of the judges both at ﬁrst instance and in the Court of Appeal. But would
either of our visitors like to say a word about this seminar, and whether
the same sort of thing occurs in the United States?
Professor Niles
(Institute of Judicial Administration, New York University):
I think it has been a very interesting example, and I will try to see
that such things do occur.
Professor Elison (University of Montana):
We do have sentencing seminars and other judicial seminars from time
to time in Montana, and we have many similar problems to those presented
here. We are not bound quite so much in this morass of the non-parole
period, and we do have the kind of legislation that was recommended.
There is no non-parole period set, but the prisoner is automatically eligible
to apply for parole after serving 20—25% of the sentence. The judge always
keeps that in mind when he is sentencing. He may think: if I give him ﬁve
years he will be up for parole in one year, and I think he ought to stay
there longer — so he is not satisfied with ﬁve years. The other big problem
we are having in our State is that it is an enormously difficult job to make
a rational determination as to when to release a person. With a part-time
. Parole Board meeting a couple of days a week, and with forty to fifty
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cases, it is not possible to make a valid determination in our jurisdiction as
to whether a person should be released or'not. We are looking for'some
changes in ‘that direction, because I think the job of release is a very
technical and difficult one, and we are not accomplishing it in Montana at
the present time.
Sir Leslie Herron:
, Thank you, Professor. Well, I think we have now had a fair coverage
of the subject, and I would only like to round off the discussion by saying
that I' am a great believer in, discretion, that I believe there is a great deal
to be said about the unexplored depths of discretion in both the judiciary
and the Parole Board, and that this seminar has left me with a feeling — an
ineradicable feeling -— that a third of the people in gaol will never reform, a
third of them shouldn’t have been sent there in the ﬁrst'place, and the
other third are probably well adapted to be candidates for release on
parole. I thank the speakers, Mr Justice Allen, Judge Levine and Mr
Morony,. for their contributions and I thank you all very much for your
attendance.
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NEWOUTH WALES
PAROLE OF PRISONERS ACT, No. 41 OF 1966
  
   
  
PAROLE ORDER
Section 6 (2)
After consideration of the case of prisoner ...................
was sentenced to1' ..................................
for the offence(s) of .................................
the Parole Board pursuant to the provisions of section 6 (2) of the Parole of Prisoners
Act, 1966, hereby authorizes and directs that the abovenamed prisoner (hereinafter
referred to as the parolee) be released from prison on parole betWeen ‘ ........
This parole order shall be in force for the period commencing‘on the date of
release from prison of the parolee and terminating ori ................
and shall be subject to the following terms and conditions:
1.
2.
the parolee shall be of good behaviour and shall not violate any law;
the parolee shall subject himself to the supervision and guidance of a parole
ofﬁcer and carry out his instructions;
the parolee shall report to a parole officer, or other person nominated by a
parole officer, in the manner and at the times directed and shall be available for
interview at such times and places as the parole officer or his nominee may from
-time to time direct;
the parolee shall enter into employment arranged or agreed upon by the parole
officer and shall notify the parole officer of any intention to change his
employment before such change occurs, or if this be impracticable, then within
such period as may have/been directed by the parole officer;
the parolee shall reside at an address arranged or agreed upon by the parole
officer and shall notify the parole officer of any intention to change his address
before such change occurs, or if this be impracticable, then within such period as
may have been directed by the parole officer;
the parolee shall not associate with any persons nominated by the parole ofﬁcer;
. 7.
 
 7.
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the parolee shall not frequent or visit anil place or district designated by the'
parole ofﬁcer.
.......Chauman
.................................. Member
........... ;....7..........;.....Member
................ r...1..............Member
.............................. 2. . . Member
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Additional conditions which are imposed. where .
appropriate, on persons admitted to parole. '
The parolee shall abstain from intoxicating liquor.
The parolee shall abstain from intoxicating liquor and. shall not visit
places where it is served or sold.
The parolee shall refrain from gambling.
The parolee shall refrain from gambling and shall not visit places
where gambling is conducted.
The parolee shall refrain from the use of, and shall not have in his
possession, any drug, except in accordance with the prescription of a
A registered medical practitioner.
The parolee shall enter ....... (hospital) and shall not leave
until he is discharged by the Medical Superintendent.
The parolee shall attend at such place as the parole officer may direct
for the purpose of undergoing psychiatric and other medical
treatment.
The parolee shall submit to such psychiatric treatment as may be
directed by the parole officer.
‘ Parole supervision shall be in conjunction with ..............
Probation and Parole Service.
The parolee shall not contact nor communicate with his wife or any
of his children.
